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Abstract : The paper aims to determine how the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) could 
be read in harmony with Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion on anonymisation techniques. To 
this end, based on an interdisciplinary methodology, a common terminology to capture the novel 
elements enshrined in the GDPR is built, and, a series of key concepts (i.e. sanitisation techniques, 
contextual controls, local linkability, global linkability, domain linkability) followed by a set of 
definitions for three types of data emerging from the GDPR are introduced. Importantly, two initial 
assumptions are made: 1) the notion of identifiability (i.e. being identified or identifiable) is used 
consistently across the GDPR (e.g. Article 4 and Recital 26); 2) the Opinion on Anonymisation 
Techniques is still good guidance as regards the classification of re-identification risks and the 
description of sanitisation techniques. It is suggested that even if these two premises seem to lead 
to an over-restrictive approach, this holds true as long as contextual controls are not combined 
with sanitisation techniques. Yet, contextual controls have been conceived as complementary to 
sanitisation techniques by the drafters of the GDPR. The paper concludes that the GDPR is 
compatible with a risk-based approach when contextual controls are combined with sanitisation 
techniques. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the debate about personal data protection has intensified as a result of an 
increasing demand for consistent and comprehensive protection of personal data leading to the 
adoption of new laws in particular in the European Union (EU). The current EU data protection 
legislation, Data Protection Directive 95/ 46/EC (DPD),1 is to be replaced by the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2 from 25 May 2018, which, being a self-executing norm, will be 
directly applicable in all the Member States in the EU. This legislative reform has generated 
repeated discussions about its potential impact on business processes and procedures as the GDPR 
contains a number of new provisions intended to benefit EU data subjects and comprises a 
strengthened arsenal of sanctions, including administrative fines of up to 4% of total worldwide 
annual turnover of the preceding financial year, for non-compliant data controllers and processors.   
One key question is to what extent the GDPR offers better tools than the DPD to frame or 
confine data analytics as well as data sharing practices. Addressing this issue requires first of all 
delineating the scope of data protection law. Second, it necessitates examining key compliance 
techniques, such as pseudonymisation, of which the raison d’être is to enable data controllers to 
strike an appropriate balance between two distinct regulatory objectives: personal data protection 
and data utility maximisation.  Not to be misleading, these challenges are not specific to the GDPR 
and will arise each time law-makers are being tasked with designing a framework aimed at 
marrying a high degree of personal data protection with some incentives to exploit the potential of 
data.  
																																								 																				
1  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 
281) 23/11/1995, p. 31- 50 (EU), at Recital 26 [hereinafter DPD].  
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 4.5.2016, p. 1–88 (EU), at Recital 26 
[hereinafter GDPR]. 
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Within the GDPR, Articles 2 and 4 are starting points in order to demarcate the material 
scope of EU data protection law. Under Article 4(1), personal data means:  
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors 
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity of that natural person; 
 
 Recital 26 further expands upon the notion of identifiability and appears to draw a 
distinction between personal data and anonymous information, with anonymous information being 
excluded from the scope of the GDPR. It is true that this key distinction was already present in the 
DPD. Nonetheless, the GDPR goes further than the DPD in that it indirectly introduces a new 
category of data as a result of Article 4,3 i.e. data that has undergone pseudonymisation, which we 
will name pseudonymised data, to use a shorter expression, although the former is more accurate 
than the latter for it implies that the state of the data is not the only qualification trigger.4 Under 
Article 4(5) pseudonymisation means: 
the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer 
be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, 
provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to 
technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not 
attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person;  
 
While the final text of the GDPR does not seem at first glance to create an ad hoc regime with 
fewer obligations for data controllers when they deal with pseudonymised data, Recital 29 
specifies:  
In order to create incentives to apply pseudonymisation when processing personal 
data, measures of pseudonymisation should, whilst allowing general analysis, be 
possible within the same controller when that controller has taken technical and 
organisational measures necessary to ensure, for the processing concerned, that this 
																																								 																				
3 GDPR, supra note 2, at Article 4(5) 
4 Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon and Alison Knight. "Anonymous data v. Personal data–A false debate: An EU perspective 
on anonymisation, pseudonymisation and personal data." Wisconsin International Law Journal (2017): 284-322. 
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Regulation is implemented, and that additional information for attributing the 
personal data to a specific data subject is kept separately. 
 
Furthermore, Article 11 of the GDPR is worth mentioning as it seems to treat with favours a third 
category of data, which we name Art.11 data for the sake of the argument. Art.11 data under Article 
115 of the GDPR, is data so that “the [data] controller is able to demonstrate that it is not in a 
position to identify the data subject.”   
Examining the GDPR a couple of questions therefore emerges: whether and when 
pseudonymised data can become anonymised data and whether and when pseudonymised data can 
be deemed to be Art. 11 data as well.   
A number of legal scholars have been investigating the contours of personal data under EU 
law, and have proposed refined categories, creating on occasion a spectrum of personal data, more 
or less complex.6 The classifications take into account the intactness of personal data (including 
direct and indirect identifiers7) and legal controls to categorise data. For instance, with masked 
direct identifiers and intact indirect identifiers, data is said to become ‘protected pseudonymous 
data’ when legal controls are put in place.8  
																																								 																				
5 GDPR, supra note 2, at Article 11. It is true that Article 11 adds that if the data subject “provides additional 
information enabling his or her identification,” Articles 15 to 20 become applicable. As the data subject is described 
as the one in possession of the additional information (and not the data controller), Art. 11 data and pseudonymised 
data should not necessarily be equated.   
6  Khaled El Emam, Eloise Gratton, Jules Polonetsky, Luk Arbuckle, “The Seven States of Data: When is 
Pseudonymous Data Not Personal Information?”, accessed March 13, 2017. https://fpf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/states-v19-1.pdf. [hereinafter The Seven States of Data]; Polonetsky, Jules, Omer Tene, and 
Kelsey Finch. "Shades of Gray: Seeing the Full Spectrum of Practical Data De-Identification." (2016) 56 , 3 Santa 
Clara Law Review 593; Mike Hintze, "Viewing The GDPR Through A De-Identification Lens: A Tool For 
Clarification And Compliance", <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2909121> [accessed March 
13, 2017]. See also Paul M. Schwartz, Daniel J. Solove. "The PII problem: Privacy and a new concept of personally 
identifiable information." NYUL rev. 86 (2011): 1814; Khaled El Emam, "Heuristics For De-Identifying Health 
Data", IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, 6/4 (2008), 58-61. 
7  Tore Dalenius,"Finding a needle in a haystack or identifying anonymous census records." Journal of official 
statistics 2, no. 3 (1986): 329. 
8 The Seven States of Data, supra 6, at 6. 
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We suggest in this paper that these approaches logically rely upon a pre-GDPR 
understanding of ‘pseudonymisation,’ which should not be confused with  GDPR Article 4 
definition and thereby have not necessarily derived the implications of the new legal definitions 
emerging from the GDPR.  
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (Art. 29 WP) did provide a comprehensive 
analysis of data anonymisation techniques9 in the light of the prescriptions of the DPD. For this 
purpose, Art. 29 WP identified three common risks and tested the robustness of data anonymisation 
techniques against these risks. However, as aforementioned this was done in 2014 against the 
background of the DPD and the relationship between these techniques and the data categories 
defined in the GDPR has not been analysed yet.  
The objective of this paper is therefore to derive the implications of the new legal 
definitions to be found more or less explicitly in the GDPR and determine how the GDPR could 
be read in harmony with Art. 29 WP’s position, in order to inform the work of researchers, 
practitioners, and ultimately policy and law-makers. To this end, we built a common terminology 
to capture the novel elements enshrined in the GDPR and thereby introduce a series of key concepts 
-sanitisation techniques, contextual controls, local linkability, global linkability, domain 
linkability- followed by a set of definitions for the three types of data emerging from the GDPR 
developed on the basis of these key concepts. The methodology implemented to create this 
terminology is interdisciplinary in nature. It combines a systematic analysis of hard law and soft 
law instruments -the GDPR, the DPD, Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law, 
Art. 29 WP opinion- with a review and assessment of key techniques available to data scientists. 
																																								 																				
9  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques (European Comm‘n, 
Working Paper No. 216, 0829/14/EN, 2014) [hereinafter Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques].  
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We conclude that, assuming the trichotomy of re-identification risks enumerated by Art. 29 WP 
should still guide the analysis post-GDPR, the GDPR makes the deployment of a risk-based 
approach possible as long as contextual controls are combined with sanitisation techniques and a 
relativist approach to data protection law is adopted.  
Consequently, the main contributions of the paper are the following: 
a) We offer a granular analysis of the three types of risks to be taken into account in order 
to assess the robustness of sanitisation techniques. The risks include singling out, 
linkability and inference, with linkability being split into local, global and domain 
linkability.   
b) We propose a classification of data sanitisation techniques and contextual controls in 
relation to the three categories of data found in the GDPR. 
c) We derive criteria for selecting sanitisation techniques and contextual controls, based 
on the three types of risks in order to assess the feasibility of a risk-based approach.  
Importantly, the two premises of the paper are the following: 1) we assume that the notion 
of identifiability (i.e. being identified or identifiable) is used consistently across the GDPR (e.g. in 
Article 4 and in Recital 26); 2) we assume that the Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques is still 
good guidance as regards the distinction drawn between the three types of re-identification risks 
and the description of sanitisation techniques. Obviously, both of these premises can be criticised 
as the GDPR has not been litigated yet and the Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques has been 
appraised critically for several reasons.10 However, we suggest that even if these two premises 
seem to lead to an over-restrictive approach, this holds true as long as contextual controls are not 
combined with sanitisation techniques. Yet, contextual controls such as technical and 
																																								 																				
10 See in particular Khaled El Emam, Cecilia Álvarez, “A critical appraisal of the Article 29 Working Party Opinion 
05/2014 on data anonymization techniques”. International Data Privacy Law 2015, 5 (1): 73-87. 
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organisational measures have been conceived as complementary to sanitisation techniques by the 
drafters of the GDPR. Contextual controls, including confidentiality obligations, are thus crucial 
to move towards a workable risk-based approach as well as a relativist approach to data protection 
law in general.   
Structure of the paper. In Section 2 we sketch the new EU data protection legal framework, i.e. 
the GDPR, give an overview of three risks identified by Art. 29 WP in relation to identification 
and identifiability, and define the key components of our common terminology. In Section 3, we 
unfold our risk-based approach for characterising the three types of data emerging from the GDPR 
and thereby derive an additional set of definitions. The classification of data sanitisation techniques 
and contextual controls is then realised in Section 4, followed by our conclusions in Section 5. 
 
1. The Three Types of Data 
As aforementioned, three types of data seem to emerge from the analysis of the GDPR. We 
define them in section 2.1 and then conceptualise the three types of risks identified by Art. 29 WP 
to assess data anonymisation and masking techniques, which we include within the broader 
category of sanitisation techniques in section 2.2 and distinguish from contextual controls.  
1.1 The GDPR Definitions 
The definitions presented in this section are derived from the GDPR, including Recital 26 
for Anonymised data, Article 4 for Pseudonymised data, and Article 11 for Art.11 data.   
- ‘Anonymised data’ means data that “does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural 
person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is 
not or no longer identifiable.”11 
																																								 																				
11 GDPR, supra note 2, at Recital 26. 
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- ‘Pseudonymised data’ means personal data that have been processed “in such a manner 
that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use 
of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and 
is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not 
attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.”12 
- ‘Art.11 data’ means data so that the data controller is “not in a position to identify the data 
subject”13 given such data.    
The notions of ‘identified’ and ‘identifiable’ thus appear of paramount importance to 
distinguish the different types of data and determine whether a category should be considered 
personal data. An individual is usually considered identified if the data can be linked to a unique 
real world identity.14 As per Recital 26, account should be “taken of all the means reasonably likely 
to be used either by the [data] controller or by another person directly or indirectly.”15 The term 
“identifiable” refers to the capability to identify an individual, who is not yet identified, but is 
described in the data in such a way that if research is conducted using additional information or 
background knowledge she can then be identified. Arguably, following the GDPR, the same 
'means test' (of Recital 26) should apply here as well. The foregoing explains why pseudonymised 
data is still (at least potentially) considered to be personal data. Recital 26 specifies that “[p]ersonal 
data which have undergone pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a natural person by 
the use of additional information should be considered to be information on an identifiable natural 
person.”  
																																								 																				
12 GDPR, supra note 2, at Article 4(5). 
13 GDPR, supra note 2, at Article 11. 
14 The Seven States of Data, supra 6. 
15 GDPR, supra note 2, at Recital 26.  
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While the two concepts of pseudonymised data and Art.11 data overlap (so as Art.11 data 
and anonymised data as it will be explained below), in order to test the extent to which they actually 
overlap it is necessary to start by conceiving them differently. Besides, Article 11 does not 
expressly refer to pseudonymisation.  
Sticking to the words of GDPR Article 4, we therefore suggest that in order to characterise 
data as pseudonymised data one has to determine whether individuals are identifiable once the 
additional information has been isolated and separated from the dataset. Furthermore, to determine 
whether individuals are identifiable once the additional information has been isolated and 
separated from the dataset, only the dataset at stake should be considered. This is why, as it will 
be explained below, the concept of pseudonymised data is intimately linked to that of local 
linkability.16  
On the other hand, in order to characterise data as Art.11 data, one has to determine whether 
a data controller is in a position to identify individuals, i.e. whether individuals are identifiable 
given the data controller’s capabilities, which should require considering all the datasets in the 
possession of the data controller; but the data controller’s capabilities only (therefore to the 
exclusion of third parties’ capabilities). This is the reason why we suggest that the concept of 
Art.11 data is intimately linked to that of domain linkability.  
Consequently, following this logic we argue that to characterise data as pseudonymised 
data or Art.11 data it is not enough to point to the fact that the individuals are not directly identified 
within the dataset at stake. As a result, data controllers should not be entitled not to comply with 
Articles 15 to 20 simply based on the fact that they have decided not to collect direct identifiers 
for the creation of the dataset at stake.  
																																								 																				
16 Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon and Alison Knight. "Anonymous data v. Personal data–A false debate: An EU perspective 
on anonymisation, pseudonymisation and personal data." Wisconsin International Law Journal (2017): 284-322. 
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1.1.1 Additional information 
As hinted above, the concept of ‘additional information’ is closely related to that of 
pseudonymised data. Indeed, it can make data subjects identified or identifiable if combined with 
pseudonymised data. The GDPR requires it to be kept separately and be subject to technical and 
organisational measures. A typical example of additional information is the encryption key used 
for encrypting and decrypting data such as attributes: the encrypted data thus becomes 
pseudonymised data when the key is separated and subject to technical and organisational 
measures such as access restriction measures.   
Two other important concepts related to additional information are that of ‘background 
knowledge’ and ‘personal knowledge.’17 In order to analyse re-identification risk properly, it is 
crucial to draw a distinction between additional information, background knowledge and personal 
knowledge. 
As per GDPR Article 4, Additional information, is the information that can be kept 
separately from the dataset by technical and organisational measures, such as encryption key, hash 
function etc.  
We distinguish additional information from background knowledge and personal 
knowledge. Background knowledge, is understood as different in kind from additional information 
as it corresponds to knowledge that is publicly accessible to an average individual who is deemed 
reasonably competent to access it, therefore most likely including the data controller himself. It 
comprises information accessible through the Web such as news websites or information found in 
public profiles of individuals or traditional newspapers. While this kind of knowledge can 
potentially have a high impact on re-identification risks, it cannot be physically separated from a 
																																								 																				
17 Information Commissioner’s Office, Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk Code Of Practice, 2012. 
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dataset. Therefore, we exclude it from additional information. However, and this is important, we 
take it into account when we analyse the three types of data by acknowledging that the potential 
existence of background knowledge makes it necessary to include singling out as a relevant risk 
for pseudonymised data within the meaning of the GDPR because as a result of a 
pseudonymisation process, the data shall not be attributable to an identifiable data subject as well. 
The same is true for Art. 11 data.18  
Personal knowledge, is assessed through the means of a subjective test (as opposed to 
background knowledge, which is assessed through the means of an objective test) and varies from 
one person to another.19 It comprises information that is not publicly accessible to an average 
individual who is deemed reasonably competent to access it, but only to certain individuals because 
of their special characteristics. For example, a motivated intruder A has the knowledge that B is 
currently in hospital, as she is B’s neighbour and she saw that B was picked up by an ambulance. 
When combined with anonymised data, this kind of subjective personal knowledge could 
obviously result in re-identification. However, for the purposes of this paper we assume that the 
likelihood that a motivated intruder has relevant personal knowledge is negligible, which partly 
depends upon his/her willingness to acquire this relevant personal knowledge and his/her 
estimation of the value of the data at stake and thereby the degree of data sensitivity. We recognise, 
however, that further sophistication would be needed for scenarios in which the likelihood that a 
motivated intruder has relevant personal knowledge is high. In particular, this would mean 
considering with care the equivalence of sanitisation techniques and contextual controls. With this 
																																								 																				
18 It might be that a less restrictive approach would be preferable but the purpose of this paper is to show that the 
restrictiveness of the approach can ultimately be mitigated with contextual controls.  
19 Information Commissioner’s Office, Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk Code Of Practice, 2012. 
 
R. Hu, S. Stalla-Bourdillon, M. Yang, V. Schiavo and V. Sassone 12 
	
said, we note that Art. 29 WP wrote in 2007 that “ a mere hypothetical possibility to  single  out  
the  individual  is  not  enough  to  consider  the  person  as  “identifiable”.”20 
1.1.2 Direct and indirect identifiers 
As described in the ISO/TS document, direct identifier is “data that can be used to identify 
a person without additional information or with cross-linking through other information that is in 
the public domain.”21 Direct identifiers contain explicitly identifying information, such as names 
and social security numbers that are uniquely linked to a data subject. In contrast, sets of attributes 
which can be combined together to uniquely identify a data subject, are called indirect identifiers. 
They include age, gender, zip code, date of birth and other basic demographic information. No 
single indirect identifier can identify an individual by its own; however, the re-identification risks 
appear when combining indirect identifiers together, as well as, as aforementioned, when 
combining records with additional information or with background knowledge. Notably, the list 
of direct and indirectly identifiers can only be derived contextually.  
1.1.3 Data sanitisation techniques  
Data sanitisation techniques process data in a form that aims to prevent re-identification of 
data subjects. Randomisation and generalisation are considered as two main families of sanitisation 
techniques.22 There is a wide range of techniques including masking techniques, noise addition, 
permutation, k-anonymity, l-diversity and differential privacy, etc. Noise addition refers to general 
techniques that make data less accurate by adding noise usually bounded by a range, e.g., [-10, 
10]. We differentiate it from differential privacy as the latter offers more rigorous guarantee. 
																																								 																				
20 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 04/2007 on the concept of personal data (European Comm‘n, 
Working Paper No. 136, 01248/07/EN), p. 15. 
21 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/TS 25237:2008 Health Informatics – Pseudonymization, 2008 
<https://www.iso.org/standard/42807.html> [accessed 13 March 2017]. 
22 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 12. 
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Masking or removal techniques are applied to direct identifiers to make sure the data subjects are 
not identified anymore and then additional techniques (including masking techniques) are then 
used to further process indirect identifiers.  It is true that k-anonymity, l-diversity, and differential 
privacy are more commonly described as privacy models rather than techniques as such. However, 
as we built upon the Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques we use a similar terminology to 
simplify the arguments.  
1.1.4 Contextual controls  
Contextual controls comprise three sets of controls. First, legal and organisational controls 
such as obligations between parties and/or internal policies adopted within one single entity (one 
party) aimed at directly reducing re-identification risks, e.g. obligation not to re-identify or not to 
link. Second, security measures (including legal, organisational and technical controls) such as 
data access monitoring and restriction measures, auditing requirements as well as additional 
security measures, such as the monitoring of queries, all of them aimed at ensuring the de facto 
enforcement of the first set of controls. Third, legal, organisational and technical controls relating 
to the sharing of datasets aimed at ensuring that the first set of legal controls are transferred to 
recipients of datasets. They include obligations to share the datasets with the same set of 
obligations or an obligation not to share the datasets, as well as technical measures such as 
encryption to make sure confidentiality of the data is maintained during the transfer of the datasets.  
These measures are used to balance the strength of data sanitisation techniques with the 
degree of data utility. In this sense, they are complementary to data sanitisation techniques. On 
one hand, they reduce residual risks, which remain after implementing data sanitisation techniques; 
on the other hand, they make it possible to preserve data utility while protecting the personal data 
of data subjects.   
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In practice, the selection of contextual controls depends on specific data sharing scenarios. 
2.2 Re-Identification Risks 
 The re-identification risks relate to ways attackers can identify data subjects within 
datasets. Art. 29 WP’s Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques23 describes three common risks 
and, examines the robustness of data sanitisation techniques against those risks.24 Underlying this 
risk classification is the premise that the means test is a tool to “assess whether the anonymisation 
process is sufficiently robust.”25  
- ‘Singling out’, which is the “possibility to isolate some or all records which identify an 
individual in the dataset.”26  
- ‘Linkability’, which is the “ability to link at least two records concerning the same data 
subject or a group of data subjects (either in the same database or in two different 
databases).”27  
- ‘Inference’, which is the “possibility to deduce, with significant probability, the value of 
an attribute from the values of other attributes.”28  
In cases in which there is background knowledge, singling out makes an individual 
identifiable. The connection between identifiability and linkability or inference is less 
straightforward. Adopting a restrictive approach one could try to argue that if background 
knowledge exists so that it is known that an individual belongs to a grouping in a dataset, the 
																																								 																				
23 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 11-12.  
24 As hinted above, it maybe that this classification needs to be re-thought as for example it does not distinguish 
between attribute disclosure and identity disclosure. This not, however, the purpose of this paper.  
25 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 8. 
26 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 11. 
27 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 11. 
28 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 12. 
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inferred attribute(s) combined with background knowledge could lead to identification or at the 
very least disclosure of (potentially sensitive) information relating to an individual.  
Art. 29 WP categorised data sanitisation techniques into ‘randomisation’, ‘generalisation’ 
and ‘masking direct identifiers’29, where randomisation and generalisation are viewed as methods 
of anonymisation but masking direct identifiers or pseudonymisation (to use the words of Art. 29 
WP) as a security measure. It should be clear from now that the GDPR definition of 
pseudonymisation is more restrictive than merely masking direct identifiers. Masking direct 
identifiers is conceived as a security measure by Art. 29 WP because it does not mitigate the three 
risks aforementioned; or rather, it simply removes/masks the direct identifiers of data subjects.  
‘Noise addition’, ‘permutation’ and ‘differential privacy’ are included within the 
randomisation group as they alter the veracity of data. More specifically, noise addition and 
permutation can reduce linkability and inference risks, but fail to prevent the singling out risk. 
Differential privacy is able to prevent all the risks up to a maximum number of queries or until the 
predefined privacy budget is exhausted but queries must be monitored and tracked when multiple 
queries are allowed on a single dataset. As regards the generalisation category, ‘K-anonymity’30 is 
considered robust against singling out, but linkability and inference risks are still present. ‘L-
diversity’31 is stronger than K-anonymity provided it first meets the minimum criterion of k-anonymity, 
as it prevents both the singling out and inference risks.  
Although Art. 29 WP has provided insights for the selection of appropriate data sanitisation 
techniques, which are relevant in the context of personal data sharing, these techniques ought to 
																																								 																				
29 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 12.  
30  Latanya Sweeney, "K-Anonymity: A Model For Protecting Privacy", International Journal Of Uncertainty, 
Fuzziness And Knowledge-Based Systems, 10/05 (2002), 557-570. 
31 Ashwin Machanavajjhala and others, "L-Diversity", ACM Transactions On Knowledge Discovery From Data, 1/1 
(2007). 
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be examined in the light of the GDPR. To be clear, the purpose of this paper is not to question the 
conceptualisation of re-identification risks undertaken by Art. 29 WP, but to deduce its 
implications when interpreting the GDPR in context.  
 
2. A Risk-based Analysis of the Three Types of Data 
In this section, we refine the concept of linkability and further specify the definitions of the 
three categories of data emerging from the GDPR using a risk-based approach. 
2.1 Local, Global and Domain Linkability 
Analysing in a more granular fashion the linkability risk defined by Art. 29 WP, it is 
possible to draw a distinction between three scenarios. The first scenario focuses on a single 
dataset, which contains multiple records about the same data subject. An attacker identifies the 
data subject by linking these records using some additional information. In the second scenario, 
the records of a data subject are included in more than one datasets, but these datasets are held 
within one entity. An attacker links the records of a data subject if she can access all the datasets 
inside the entity, e.g., insider threat.32 The third scenario also involves more than one datasets, but 
these datasets are not necessarily held within one entity. Based on these three scenarios, we 
distinguish between three types of linkability risks: 
- ‘Local Linkability’, which is the ability to link records that correspond to the same data 
subject within the same dataset.  
- ‘Domain linkability’, which is the ability to link records that correspond to the same data 
subject in two or more datasets that are in the possession of the data controller. 
																																								 																				
32  Theoharidou Marianthi and others, "The Insider Threat To Information Systems And The Effectiveness Of 
ISO17799", Computers & Security, 24/6 (2005), 472-484. 
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- ‘Global Linkability’, which is the ability to link records that correspond to the same data 
subject in any two or more datasets. 
Based on this granular analysis of the linkability risk and assuming the concept of 
identifiability is used consistently across the GDPR, we suggest one way to derive the main 
characteristics of anonymised, pseudonymised and Art. 11 data within the meaning of the GDPR. 
2.2 Anonymised Data 
Anonymised data, according to the GDPR definition, is a state of data for which data 
subjects are not identified nor identifiable anymore, taking into account all the means reasonably 
likely to be used by the data controller as well as third parties. While strictly speaking the legal 
test to be found in Recital 26 of the GDPR does not mention all of the three risks aforementioned 
(i.e. singling out, linkability and inference), we assume for the purposes of this paper that for 
anonymised data to be characterised, singling out, local linkability, domain linkability, global 
linkability and inference should be taken into account. As aforementioned, whether the three re-
identification risks should be re-conceptualised is a moot point at this stage. Suffice it note that not 
all singling out, linkability and inference practices lead to identifiability and identification. A case-
by-case approach is therefore needed.  
2.3 Pseudonymised Data 
Pseudonymised data, being the outcome of the pseudonymisation process defined by the 
GDPR in its Article 4, is a state of data for which data subjects can no longer be identified or 
identifiable when examining the dataset at stake (and only the dataset at stake). Nevertheless, the 
foregoing holds true on the condition that data controllers separate the additional information and 
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put in place “technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not 
attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.” 
As a result, it appears that pseudonymisation within the meaning of the GDPR is not 
tantamount to masking direct identifiers.  In addition, although a number of studies stress the 
importance of legal controls,33  there are different routes to pseudonymised data depending upon 
the robustness of the sanitisation technique implemented, as it is explained below. 
One important element of the GDPR definition of pseudonymisation is the concept of 
additional information, which can identify data subjects if combined with the dataset. The 
definition specifies that such additional information is kept separately and safeguarded, so that the 
risks relating to the additional information can be excluded. This seems to suggest that in this 
context the notion of identifiability should only relate to the dataset at stake. Based on this analysis, 
we define pseudonymised data as a data state for which the risks of singling out, local linkability 
and inference should be mitigated. At this stage, the domain and global linkability risks are not 
relevant and the data controller could for example be in possession of other types of datasets.  
In order to mitigate the singling out, local linkability and inference risks at the same time, 
data sanitisation techniques must be selected and implemented on the dataset. As aforementioned, 
Art. 29 WP has examined several sanitisation techniques in relation to re-identification risks.34 We 
build on the upshot of the Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, and find that K-anonymity, L-
diversity and other stronger techniques can prevent these risks, but masking direct identifiers, noise 
																																								 																				
33 See e.g. The Seven States of Data, supra 6; Polonetsky, Jules, Omer Tene, and Kelsey Finch. "Shades of Gray: 
Seeing the Full Spectrum of Practical Data De-Identification." (2016) 56, 3 Santa Clara Law Review 593. 
34 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 13-21. 
R. Hu, S. Stalla-Bourdillon, M. Yang, V. Schiavo and V. Sassone 19 
	
addition, permutation alone are insufficient to reasonably mitigate the singling out, local linkability 
and inference risks.  
The example below illustrates the mitigation of these three risks using K-anonymity.   
Example. Table 1 shows a sanitised dataset with k-anonymity guarantee (k=4) released by 
hospital A in May. Suppose an attacker obtains relevant background knowledge from a news 
website that a famous actor Bob was recently sent to hospital A and that by checking the time it 
can be deduced that Bob is in the dataset at stake. Suppose as well that the attacker has no access 
to additional information (e.g. the raw dataset). Since each group of this dataset has at least 4 
records sharing the same non-sensitive attribute values, the attacker cannot distinguish his target 
Bob from other records. This prevents the risks of singling out and local linkability. Moreover, the 
attacker is not able to infer the sensitive attribute of Bob because she is not sure to which group 
Bob belongs. Therefore, this dataset is pseudonymised within the meaning of the GDPR.  
Table 1 An example of Pseudonymised data using k-anonymity (k=4) 
 Non-Sensitive Sensitive 
 Zip code  Age Nationality Diagnosis 
1 250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
<30 
<30 
<30 
<30 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Cancer 
Viral Infection 
AIDS 
Viral Infection 
2 
3 
4 
5 250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
3* 
3* 
3* 
3* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Cancer 
Flu 
Cancer 
Flu 
6 
7 
8 
 
2.4 Art. 11 Data 
Art. 11 data, by definition, focuses on the ability of a data controller to identify data 
subjects to the exclusion of third parties. More specifically, the data controller should be able to 
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demonstrate that she is “not in a position to identify the data subject.”35 First, this implies that 
direct identifiers (e.g. names, social security number etc.) have been removed or have never been 
collected. In other words, Art. 11 data is either sanitised by a certain process or not.  Second, “not 
being in a position to identify the data subject” should also imply that the combination of indirect 
identifiers does not lead to identification. There exist also situations where data controller only 
collect indirect identifiers but a very rich of list of indirect identifiers for which arguably, and this 
is crucial, no accessible relevant background knowledge exists and the data controller is not in a 
possession of other datasets which could be linked to the first one, e.g. dynamic IP addresses, 
browsed websites and search terms, transactions…  in order to create profiles and ultimately make 
decisions about individuals. We suggest that while an approach purely based on a re-identification 
risks approach would lead to exempting data controllers from Articles 15 to 20 in these situations, 
this would not necessarily be consistent with the spirit of the GDPR, which aims to strengthen the 
protection of data subjects in cases of profiling. As a result, in order to determine whether data is 
personal data and the full data protection regime applies two scenarios must be taken into account: 
1) whether re-identification risks have been appropriately mitigated and 2) whether profiling and 
decisions about individuals are made.    
Importantly, Art. 11 definition requires that to determine whether the data is Art. 11 data, 
all the means of the data controller should be considered to the exclusion of third parties’ means. 
As a result, Art. 11 data can be interpreted as a state of data for which there are no risks of singling 
out, domain linkability and inference.  The protection applied to Art. 11 data is therefore stronger 
than the protection applied to pseudonymised data because the former requires mitigating the 
domain linkability rather than local linkability risk. This does not mean that pseudonymised data 
																																								 																				
35 GDPR, supra note 2, at Article 11. 
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cannot be transformed into Art. 11 data. The example below illustrates the difference between Art. 
11 and pseudonymised data. 
Example. Suppose two hospitals H1 and H2 located in a same city publish patient data 
frequently, e.g., weekly.  Table 2(a) is the dataset sanitised and published by H1 using k-anonymity 
(k=4).  The dataset achieves the state of pseudonymised data as no record in the table can be 
attributed to a specific data subject without using additional information. Furthermore, H1 claims 
that it is not able to identify any data subject using any other information within the domain/access 
of H1. This other information could be the datasets previously published by H1 and H2. One week 
later, H2 publishes its own patient dataset. It sanitises the data using k-anonymity (k=6) and 
achieves the state of pseudonymised data, as shown in Table 2(b). Now H2 wants to determine 
whether the dataset (Table 2(b)) is also Art. 11 data. H2 is in possession of other information 
(different from the concept of additional information) comprising Table 2(a), and background 
knowledge deriving from a news website (which has been read by many people in the city) saying 
that a 28-year-old celebrity living in zip code 25013 has been sent to both H1 and H2 to seek a 
cure for his illness. H2 thus goes through the medical records of each patient. With the other 
information, H2 knows that the celebrity must be one of the four records in Table 2(a) and one of 
the six records in Table 2(b). H2 is therefore able to identify the celebrity by combining Table 2(a) 
and Table 2(b), because only one patient was diagnosed with the disease that appears in both tables, 
i.e., cancer. As a result, H2 can be sure that the celebrity matches the first record of both tables, 
and the celebrity has cancer. Therefore, Table 2(b) comprises pseudonymised data but not 
necessarily Art. 11 data.  
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Table 2(a) 4-anonymous patient data from H1          Table 2(b) 6-anonymous patient data from H2 
  
We summarise the three types of data based on the risks aforementioned in the following 
table.   
Table 3 Risk-based interpretation for three types of data 
 Singling 
out 
Local 
linkability 
domain 
linkability 
Global 
linkability  
Inference  
Anonymised data No No No No No 
Art. 11 data No No No N/A No 
Pseudonymised 
data 
No No N/A N/A No 
 
3. Data Sanitisation Techniques and Contextual Controls  
We now examine the robustness of data sanitisation techniques against the five types of re-
identification risks. Taking into account data sharing contexts, we present a hybrid assessment 
comprising both contextual controls and data sanitisation techniques. 
3.1 Effectiveness of data sanitisation techniques 
 Non-Sensitive Sensitive 
 Zip code  Age B_city Diagnosis 
1 250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
<30 
<30 
<30 
<30 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Cancer 
Viral Infection 
AIDS 
Viral Infection 
2 
3 
4 
5 250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
3* 
3* 
3* 
3* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
AIDS 
Heart Disease 
Heart Disease 
Viral Infection 
6 
7 
8 
9 250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
³40 
³40 
³40 
³40 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Cancer 
Cancer 
Flu 
Flu 
10 
11 
12 
	
 Non-Sensitive Sensitive 
 Zip code  
Ag
e B_city Diagnosis 
1 250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
<35 
<35 
<35 
<35 
<35 
<35 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Cancer 
Tuberculosis 
Heart Disease 
Heart Disease 
Flu 
Flu 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
250** 
³35 
³35 
³35 
³35 
³35 
³35 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Heart Disease 
Viral Infection 
Flu 
Flu 
Flu 
Flu 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
	
R. Hu, S. Stalla-Bourdillon, M. Yang, V. Schiavo and V. Sassone 23 
	
We build upon the table of data sanitisation techniques presented by Art. 29 WP36 by 
splitting the linkability risk into local and global linkability. At this stage, domain linkability is not 
explicitly shown in the table as it is included in global linkability. The table below summarises the 
results.  
Table 4 Robustness of data sanitisation techniques 
 Is singling 
out still a 
risk? 
Is local 
linkability still 
a risk? 
Is 
domain/global 
linkability still a 
risk? 
Is inference 
still a risk? 
Masking direct identifiers Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Noise Addition Yes May not May not May not 
Permutation Yes Yes Yes May not 
Masking indirect 
identifiers 
Yes Yes Yes May not 
K-anonymity No No Yes Yes 
L-diversity No No Yes May not 
Differential privacy May not May not May not May not 
 
Note that domain linkability is in the same column as global linkability, because for both 
situations external datasets need to be taken into account and the listed data sanitisation techniques 
are not able to distinguish between different types of domains. While one should revert to 
explanations provided by Art. 29 WP37 for the analysis of the singling out and inference risks, we 
then discuss the robustness of sanitisation techniques in relation to local, domain and global 
linkability risks.  
Masking direct identifiers. Applying the techniques, such as encryption, hashing and 
tokenisation on direct identifiers, can reduce linkability between a record and the original identity 
of a data subject (e.g., name). However, it is still possible to single out data subjects’ records with 
																																								 																				
36 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 24. 
37 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 13-21. 
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the pseudonymised attributes. If the same pseudonymised attribute is used for the same data subject, 
then records in one or more datasets can be linked together. If different pseudonymised attributes 
are used for the same data subject and there is at least one common attribute between records, it is 
still possible to link records using other attributes. Therefore, the local, domain and global 
linkability risks exist in both situations. 
Noise Addition. This technique adds noise to attributes, making the values of such 
attributes inaccurate or less precise. However, this technique cannot mitigate local, domain and 
global linkability risks. Indeed, this technique only reduces the reliability of linking records to data 
subjects as the values of attributes are more ambiguous. Records may still be linked using wrong 
attribute values.  
Permutation. Permutation is a technique that consists in shuffling values of attributes 
within a dataset. More specifically, it swaps values of attributes among different records. It can be 
considered as a special type of noise addition38 though it retains the range and distribution of the 
values. Therefore, it is still vulnerable to the local, domain and global linkability risks based on 
the shuffled values of attributes, although such linking may be inaccurate as an attribute value may 
be attached to a different subject.  
K-anonymity. As the main technique of the generalisation family, K-anonymity is applied 
to prevent singling out. They group a data subject with at least k-1 other individuals who share a 
same set of attribute values.39 These techniques are able to prevent local linkability, because the 
probability of linking two records to the same data subject is no more than 1/k. However, they are 
																																								 																				
38 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 13. 
39 Latanya Sweeney, "K-Anonymity: A Model For Protecting Privacy", International Journal Of Uncertainty, 
Fuzziness And Knowledge-Based Systems, 10/05 (2002), 557-570. 
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not able to mitigate the domain and global linkability risks. As shown in our example of the two 
hospitals, records relating to the celebrity can be linked together via an intersection attack.40  
L-diversity. Compared with K-anonymity, the significant improvement of L-diversity is 
that it ensures the sensitive attribute in each equivalence class has at least L different values.41 
Thus, it prevents the risk of inference to the probability of no more than 1/L. However, like K-
anonymity, it cannot prevent domain and global linkability as shown in our example of two 
hospitals because it is still possible to link records together if they have the same sensitive attribute 
values. 
Differential privacy. Differential privacy is one of the randomisation techniques that can 
ensure protection in a mathematical way by adding a certain amount of random noise to the 
outcome of queries.42 Differential privacy means that it is not possible to determine whether a data 
subject is included in a dataset given the query outcome. In the situation where multiple queries 
on one or more datasets are allowed, the queries must however be tracked and the noise should be 
tuned accordingly to ensure attackers cannot infer more information based on the outcomes of 
multiple queries. Therefore, “May not” is assigned for the risks depending on whether queries are 
tracked.   
Masking indirect identifiers. As described before, encryption, hashing and tokenisation 
are the techniques for masking direct identifiers. They can also be implemented on indirect 
																																								 																				
40 Srivatsava Ranjit Ganta, Shiva Prasad Kasiviswanathan and Adam Smith, "Composition Attacks And Auxiliary 
Information In Data Privacy", Proceeding Of The 14Th ACM SIGKDD International Conference On Knowledge 
Discovery And Data Mining - KDD 08, 2008. 
41 Ashwin Machanavajjhala and others, "L-Diversity", ACM Transactions On Knowledge Discovery From Data, 1/1 
(2007), 3-es. 
42 Cynthia Dwork, "Differential Privacy: A Survey Of Results", in In International Conference On Theory And 
Applications Of Models Of Computation (Berlin Heidelberg, 2008), 1-19. 
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identifiers. We observe that these techniques are not able to mitigate the risks of local, domain and 
global linkability. Taking a dataset with three quasi-identifiers - gender, address and date of birth, 
for example, a hash function encrypts the combination of the three quasi-identifiers. If there are 
two records in the dataset (or different datasets) corresponding to a same data subject, then they 
will have the same hashed values for these three attributes.   
We now combine our risk-based interpretation of three types of data (Table 3) with the 
foregoing analysis of the robustness of data sanitisation techniques (Table 4), in order to classify 
the output of different techniques into three types of data.  
Table 5 The results of data sanitisation techniques 
Techniques Pseudonymised 
data 
Art. 11 data Anonymised 
data 
Masking direct identifiers Not Not   Not 
Noise Addition Not Not Not 
Permutation Not Not Not 
Masking indirect identifiers Not Not Not 
K-anonymity Not Not Not 
L-diversity Yes Not Not 
Differential Privacy Maybe Maybe Maybe 
 
As the first four techniques are not able to mitigate the risk of singling out, the outcome of 
these four techniques cannot be pseudonymised data, Art. 11 data, or anonymised data. For K-
anonymity, it cannot produce any of these three data types because it only mitigates singling out 
and local linkability to the exclusion of inference when additional information is isolated and 
safeguarded. Notably, background knowledge is taken into account. Data after implementing L-
diversity is pseudonymised data because it can mitigate singling out, local linkability, and 
inference, but not domain linkability or global linkability. As for Art. 11 data, L-diversity does not 
mitigate against the fact that data controllers have within their domain other datasets, which can 
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be used to link records together. Hence, “Not” is assigned. Differential privacy can guarantee Art. 
11 data, pseudonymised data or anonymised data if only single query on one dataset is allowed or 
multiple queries are tracked.  
So far, we have classified data sanitisation techniques with respect to the three types of 
data. It is worth mentioning that data sanitisation techniques are often combined in practice. Table 
5 derives the sanitisation outcome in situations where two or more techniques are implemented. 
For example, (K, L) - anonymity43 combining K-anonymity and L-diversity, ensures that each 
equivalent class has at least K records, and their sensitive attributes have at least L different values. 
(K, L) - anonymity guarantees that there are no risks of singling out, local linkability and inference.  
3.2 Improving data utility with contextual controls 
Maintaining an appropriate balance between data utility and data protection is not an easy 
task for data controllers. As discussed in Section 4.1, K-anonymity, L-diversity and differential 
privacy are the sole potential techniques that can make data pseudonymised, Art. 11 or anonymised 
data. However, these techniques could introduce undesired distortion on data, making data less 
useful for data analysts. Contextual controls are thus crucial to complement data sanitisation 
techniques and reduce risks.44 Obviously, the strength of the contextual control to add should 
depend upon the type of data sharing scenarios at hand.   
																																								 																				
43 Ji-Won Byun and others, "Privacy-Preserving Incremental Data Dissemination", Journal Of Computer Security, 
17/1 (2009), 43-68. 
44 Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories (LIfBi), Star Ng Cohort 6: Adults (SC6) SUF Version 7.0.0 Anonymiza 
On Procedures Tobias Koberg, 2009 <https://www.neps-
data.de/Portals/0/NEPS/Datenzentrum/Forschungsdaten/SC6/7-0-0/SC6_7-0-0_Anonymization.pdf> [accessed 13 
March 2017]. 
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In order to take into account the variety of data sharing scenarios, we distinguish between 
two types of contextual legal controls: ‘inter-party’ and ‘internal controls’. The former category 
comprises obligations between parties (i.e. data collector/data releaser and data recipient), and the 
latter comprises internal policies adopted within one entity, i.e. one party. As shown in Table 6, 
the top rows of controls are meant to directly address the re-identification risks. The middle rows 
list the controls used to ensure that the first set of controls are actually implemented. More 
specifically, security measures are measures that relate to location of storage, access to data, 
training of staff and enforcement of internal policies. Additional security measures are associated 
with differential privacy only and are required to guarantee differential privacy mitigates all the 
risks. The third set of controls is essential when data are shared in order to make sure recipients of 
datasets put in place the necessary controls to maintain the dataset within its initial category: 
depending upon the sensitivity of the data they take the form of obligations/policies not to share 
the data or an obligation to share the data alike, i.e. with the same controls. Technical measures, 
such as encryption, can complement these obligations to make sure confidentiality of the data is 
maintained during the transfer of the dataset to the recipients.  
 
Table 6 Inter-party (obligations) and Internal (policies) controls 
1. Mitigating 
risks 
directly 
Singling out risk 
• Obligation/Policy to isolate info to de-mask direct identifiers with 
security measures in relation to location of storage, access to 
formula, training of staff and enforcement of rules 
• Obligation/Policy not to identify from indirect identifiers 
Local linkability risk  
• Obligation/Policy not to link records in the same dataset 
domain linkability risk 
Obligation/Policy not to link with other datasets within the same 
domain 
Global linkability risk 
• Obligation/Policy not to link with other datasets  
Inference risk 
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Obligation/Policy not to infer attributes from existing attributes 
2. Enforcing 
the 
mitigation 
Security measures 
• Obligation/Policy to implement security measures in relation to 
location of storage, access to dataset, auditing, training of staff and 
enforcement of internal policy rules 
Additional security measures 
• Obligation/Policy to monitor queries and query outcome after 
applying differential privacy  
3. Transferring 
controls 
• Obligation/Policy not to re-share or to re-share with the same set of 
obligations  
• Obligation to share data in an encrypted state, e.g., through an 
encrypted communication channel 
 
It is now time to combine data sanitisation techniques and contextual controls to determine 
when and how it is possible to maintain data utility. This is the objective of Tables 7 and 8.  
Two types of actors are distinguished to take into account the implications of data sharing 
scenarios: data collectors, who collect original data and transform the data in certain data types 
before sharing the data; and data recipients, who receive processed data and may have to 
implement controls in order to ensure the data remain within the desired data category. Table 7 
only concerns data collectors. This is why no inter-party controls are considered. 
 
Table 7 Sanitisation options when data are in the hands of data collectors 
Desired data 
type 
Sanitisation options 
Pseudonymised 
data 
• Masking direct identifiers + Policies on singling out, local linkability and 
inference risks + Security measures 
• K-anonymity + Policy on inference risk + Security measures 
• L-diversity + Security measures 
Art. 11 data • Masking direct identifiers/Collecting only indirect identifiers + Policies on 
singling out, domain linkability risks + Security measures 
• K-anonymity + Policies on inference and domain linkability risks + Security 
measures 
• L-diversity + Policy on domain linkability risk + Security measures 
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Anonymised 
data 
• Masking direct identifiers + Policies on singling out, local, global linkability and 
inference risks + Security measures 
• K-anonymity + Policies on inference and global linkability risks + Security 
measures 
• L-diversity + Policies on global linkability risk + Security measures 
• Differential privacy + Security measures + Additional security measures 
  
In the first row of the table, data fall into the category of pseudonymised data when the 
singling out, local linkability and inference risks have been mitigated. When implementing a weak 
sanitisation technique only, i.e. masking direct identifiers, those risks still persist as explained 
above and contextual controls are therefore needed. Stronger data sanitisation techniques, such as 
K-anonymity and L-diversity, mitigate more risks, which explains why fewer and/or weaker 
contextual controls are needed. For instance, when L-diversity is implemented, only security 
measures are required for achieving pseudonymised data.  
In the end the selection of data sanitisation techniques and contextual controls should 
depend on the type of data sharing scenario pursued (closed or open) given both the sensitivity and 
the utility of the data.  
Data in the second category, i.e. Art. 11 data, implies that the data controller is able to 
demonstrate that she is not in a position to identify data subjects. The listed options ensure that 
there are no singling out, domain linkability and inference risks.  
Data in the final category is anonymised data, which require the strongest protection, i.e. 
that no singling out, local and global linkability and inference risks exist. Differential privacy is 
one of the options, and only security measures are required when differential privacy is 
implemented.    
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Table 8 concerns data recipients. As for data recipients who receive processed data, they 
should take into account (i) the data sanitisation techniques that have been implemented on the 
received data, and (ii) the obligations imposed by data releasers.  
 
Table 8 Sanitisation options when data are in the hands of data recipients 
Desired data type Sanitisation 
techniques 
implemented 
on received 
data 
Obligations imposed 
upon data recipients 
Sanitisation options 
Pseudonymised 
data 
Masking direct 
identifiers 
Obligations on singling 
out, local linkability 
and inference risks + 
obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Policies on singling out, 
local linkability and 
inference risks + Security 
measures 
• K-anonymity + Policy on 
inference risk + Security 
measures 
• L-diversity + Security 
measures  
K-anonymity Obligation on inference 
risk + obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Security measures 
• L-diversity + Security 
measures 
L-diversity Obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Security measures 
Art. 11 data Masking direct 
identifiers 
Obligations on singling 
out, inference, local and 
domain linkability risks 
+ obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Policies on singling out, 
inference, local and 
domain linkability risks + 
Security measures  
• K-anonymity + Policies 
on inference, domain 
linkability risks + 
Security measures  
• L-diversity + Policy on 
domain linkability risk + 
Security measures 
K-anonymity Obligations on 
inference and domain 
linkability risks + 
obligation on 
• Policies on inference and 
domain linkability risks + 
Security measures  
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implementing security 
measures 
• L-diversity + Policy on 
domain linkability risk + 
Security measures  
L-diversity Obligation on domain 
linkability risk + 
obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Policy on domain 
linkability risk + Security 
measures  
Anonymised data Masking direct 
identifiers 
Obligations on singling 
out, local, global 
linkability and 
inference risks + 
obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Policies on singling out, 
local, global linkability 
and inference risks + 
Security measures  
• K-anonymity + Policies 
on inference and global 
linkability risks + 
Security measures 
• L-diversity + Policy on 
global linkability risk + 
Security measures 
• Differential privacy + 
Security measures + 
Additional security 
measures 
K-anonymity Obligations on 
inference and global 
linkability risks + 
obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Policies on global 
linkability and inference 
risks + Security measures  
• L-diversity + Policy on 
global linkability risk + 
Security measures 
• Differential privacy + 
Security measures + 
Additional security 
measures 
L-diversity Obligation on global 
linkability risk + 
obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Policy on global 
linkability risk + Security 
measures  
• Differential privacy + 
Security measures + 
Additional security 
measures 
Differential 
privacy 
Obligation on 
implementing security 
measures 
• Security measures + 
Additional security 
measures 
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Table 8 provides a number of sanitisation options that data recipients can select to meet 
their data protection and utility requirements. We take pseudonymised data as an example. 
Suppose a data recipient receives data that were processed with K-anonymity techniques and she 
aims to keep the data in a pseudonymised state. The data recipient has thus two options. Either she 
does not change the data and simply adopt policies and security measures; or she further processes 
the data with L-diversity, and adopt different types of policies as well as security measures.   
Another consideration is worth mentioning. If the data collector keeps the original raw 
dataset, the original raw dataset should be conceived as falling within the category of additional 
information for the purposes of characterising personal data and within the category of the data 
controller’s domain for the purposes of characterising Art. 11 data. As regards anonymised data, 
Art. 29 WP seems to suggest that as long as the raw dataset is not destroyed the sanitised dataset 
cannot be characterised as anonymised data. 45  Applying a risk-based approach of the type 
developed in this paper would lead to the opposite result. This said, and this is essential, this would 
not mean that the data controller transforming and releasing the raw dataset into anonymised data 
would not be subject to any duty anymore. It would actually make sense to impose upon the data 
controller a duty to make sure recipients of the dataset put in place the necessary contextual 
controls. This duty could be performed by imposing upon recipients an obligation not to share the 
dataset or to share the dataset alike, depending upon data sensitiveness and data utility 
requirements. Ultimately, the data controller would also be responsible for choosing the 
appropriate mix of sanitisation techniques and contextual controls as the anonymisation process as 
such is still a processing activity governed by the GDPR. Data controllers could thus be required 
to monitor best practices in the field even after the release of the anonymised data. 
																																								 																				
45 Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques, supra note 9, at 10. 
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Finally it should be added that the foregoing analysis implies a relativist approach to data 
protection law, which would require determining the status of a dataset on a case-by-case basis 
and thereby for each specific data sharing scenario.  
3.3 Improving data utility with dynamic sanitisation techniques and contextual controls 
Re-identification risks are not static and evolve over time. This should mean that data 
controllers should regularly assess these risks and take appropriate measures when their increase 
is significant.  
Notably, adapting sanitisation techniques and contextual controls over time can help reduce 
re-identification risks. At least one dynamic sanitisation technique is worth mentioning here: 
changing pseudonyms over time for each use or each type of use as a way to mitigate linkability.46 
Besides, techniques like k-anonymity and l-diversity can also be conceived as dynamic techniques 
as deploying k or l on the same dataset for new recipients can provide stronger protection when 
the data controller observes that re-identification risks increase. 
At the same time, data recipients should be aware of the limits imposed upon the use of the 
data, even if the data is characterised as anonymised. This is a logical counterpart to any risk-based 
approach and necessarily implies that data controllers and data recipients are in continuous direct 
contact, at least when differential privacy is not opted for. Indeed, contextual controls put in place 
for mitigating risks directly (in order to preserve data utility) could be coupled with confidentiality 
obligations and/or confidentiality policy, be it relative (i.e. formulated as an obligation to share 
alike) or absolute (i.e. formulated as a prohibition to share). Importantly, taking confidentiality 
																																								 																				
46 Mike Hintze and Gary LaFever, "Meeting Upcoming GDPR Requirements While Maximizing The Full Value Of 
Data Analytics", <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927540 > [accessed March 13, 2017]. See 
also Jonas Almeida, Ph.D. and others, "Big Data In Healthcare And Life Sciences Anonos Bigprivacy Technology 
Briefing", <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941953> [accessed April 12, 2017]. 
.  
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obligations seriously would then make it possible to then assess the likelihood of the singling out, 
linkability and inference risks leading to re-identification and could make certain types of singling 
out, linking and inferring practices possible, as long as the purpose of the processing is not to re-
identify data subjects and there is not a reasonable likelihood that the processing will lead to re-
identification. It is true, nevertheless that the choice of confidentiality obligations coupled with 
weak sanitisation techniques can prove problematic if datasets are shared with multiple parties, 
even if each receiving party agrees to be bound by confidentiality obligations and adopt internal 
policies for this purpose. Obviously, access restrictions techniques and policies are a crucial means 
to make sure confidentiality obligations and policies are performed and/or implemented in 
practice.  
Notably, while in the Breyer case of 2016 the CJEU interpreting the notion of “additional data 
which is necessary in order to identify the user of a website” considered the information held by 
the user’s internet access provider, the CJEU recognised the importance of legal means in order to 
characterise personal data.47 We suggest contractual obligations should be taken seriously into 
consideration in particular when they are backed up by technical measures such as measures to 
restrict access and dynamic measures to mitigate linkability.  
 
 
																																								 																				
47 CJEU, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 19 October 2016, EU:C:2016:779. See in 
particular paragraph 39 where the CJEU, interpreting the DPD, states:  
 
Next, in order to determine whether, in the situation described in paragraph 37 of the present 
judgment, a dynamic IP address constitutes personal data within the meaning of Article 2(a) of 
Directive 96/45 in relation to an online media services provider, it must be ascertained whether 
such an IP address, registered by such a provider, may be treated as data relating to an ‘identifiable 
natural person’ where the additional data necessary in order to identify the user of a website that 
the services provider makes accessible to the public are held by that user’s internet service 
provider. 
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4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to test the possibility of interpreting the GDPR and Art. 29 
WP’s Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques together, assuming the concept of identifiability has 
two legs (identified and identifiable), the three risks of singling out, linkability and inference are 
relevant for determining whether an individual is identifiable and the concept of identifiability is 
used consistently across the GDPR. On the basis of an interdisciplinary methodology, this paper 
therefore builds a common terminology to describe different data states and derive the meaning of 
key concepts emerging from the GDPR: anonymised data, pseudonymised data and Art. 11 data. 
It then unfolds a risk-based approach, which is suggested to be compatible with the GDPR, by 
combining data sanitisation techniques and contextual controls in an attempt toeffectively balance 
data utility and data protection requirements. The proposed approach relies upon a granular 
analysis of re-identification risks expanding upon the threefold distinction suggested by Art. 29 
WP in its Opinion on Anonymisation Techniques. It thus starts from the three common re-
identification risks listed as relevant by Art. 29 WP, i.e. singling out, linkability and inference and 
further distinguishes between local, domain and global linkability to capture the key concepts of 
additional information and pseudonymisation introduced in the GDPR and comprehend the 
domain of Article 11 as well as the implications of Recital 26. Consequently, the paper aims to 
make it clear that even if a restrictive approach to re-identification is assumed, the GDPR makes 
the deployment of a risk-based approach possible: such an approach implies the combination of 
both contextual controls and sanitisation techniques and thereby the adoption of a relativist 
approach to data protection law. Among contextual controls, confidentiality obligations are crucial 
in order to reasonably mitigate re-identification risks.  
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